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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHTS OF ALIENS-CITIZENSHIP AS A
REQUIREMENT FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR IS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL
PROTECTION.
After graduating from law school in 1970, the plaintiff applied for permis-
sion to take the Connecticut bar examination. Having found the plaintiff quali-
fied in all other respects, the County Bar association rejected her application
solely on the basis that she was not a citizen of the United States' as required
by Rule 8(l) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963).' The plaintiffs claim
that the regulation was unconstitutional was rejected by both the Superior
Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut.3 On appeal, held, reversed. A
state court rule restricting admission to the bar to citizens of the United States
is unconstitutional in that it denies equal protection of the law to resident
aliens. In Re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851 (1973).
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the "friendly alien"' enjoyed
substantially all the rights and protections of citizens.5 As the nation became
industrialized6 in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the states began to
restrict the employment opportunities of aliens. 7 As a consequence of such
legislative restrictions aliens turned to the courts for redress of their griev-
ances. s The courts first squarely confronted 9 the problem in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins in 1889.10 In this case, the Supreme Court overturned a fire prevention
ordinance which restricted the operation of laundries in wooden buildings. On
its face, the ordinance seemed a valid exercise of police power, but in fact was
used to discriminate against Chinese. The Court declared that "[t]he Four-
'The plaintiff first came to this country on a visit in 1965. In 1967, she married a citizen of the
United States and settled in Connecticut. She is eligible for naturalization by reason of both her
marriage and the duration of her residence in the United States, but she has no present intention
of becoming a citizen.
2The requirements for the bar examination are fixed by the Superior Court, CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 61-80 (1959).
3in Re Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 294 A.2d 281 (1972).
"'Friendly aliens" are citizens of a nation at peace with the United States. Johnson v. Eisentra-
ger, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2 (1949).
1M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW I (1946).
'In addition to the rapid industrialization of this country, other explanations for use of restric-
tions on the employment of aliens include the disappearance of the frontier, the large increase in
urban population, and the limited employment opportunities of the nineteenth century. Rok v.
Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243, 245 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
7For example, the predecessor to Rule 8(l) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) was enacted
in 1879. 1879 Practice Book §§ 4(3), 8.
'See M. KONVITZ, supra note 5, at 180.
'In Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872), the Court noted that the practice
of law "in no sense depends on citizenship of the United States," but this case did not concern an
alien and held only that the practice of law is not a privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment.
10118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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teenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of
citizens,"" and that aliens are "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection -clause. 2 With one notable exception, 3 there
followed a period of about thirty years in which the Supreme Court was far
less generous in its treatment of aliens. 4 During this period of time, the courts
used either the theory of the state's proprietary interest over the subject matter
of the occupation 15 or the theory of the proprietary interest of the state over
certain positions'" to justify the denial of aliens' right to work. The former
theory was used in Patsone v. Pennsylvania7 in which the Supreme Court
upheld a Pennsylvania statute barring aliens from hunting wild game. The
latter theory was used in Heim v. McCall and Crane v. New York 9 to uphold
a statute which restricted employment on public works projects to United
States citizens. In Crane,20 Judge Cardozo reasoned that the tax money of a
state is the property of its citizens and thus an alien has no right to object to
its disposition. In Heim' the Court followed the view that no one has an
absolute right to work for the state, and, quoting from Atkins v. Kansas, 2
declared "It cannot be deemed a part of the liberty of any contractor that he
be allowed do do public work in any mode he may choose to adopt, without
regard to the wishes of the state."
In 1915, approximately one month prior to the decisions in Crane and Heim,
the Supreme Court in Truax v. Raich 3 invalidated an Arizona statute provid-
ing that every employer of five or more persons must employ at least eighty
percent qualified electors or native-born citizens. Since the Arizona statute in
"Id. at 369.
'
21d.
'In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), which concerned a Chinese laborer
attempting to avoid being deported, the Court noted that as long as aliens are legally permitted to
remain in this country, they are entitled to all the safeguards of the Constitution and to the
protection of the laws in regard to their rights.
"See, e.g., Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Heim v. McCall, 214 N.Y. 629, 108
N.E. 1106 (1915), affd, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915),
affd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
"SThe state's proprietary interest over the subject matter of the occupation has been expressed
in two ways: I) The government as a trustee exercises ownership for the people; 2) The people hold
title in their collective capacity. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530 (1896). See also Begay v.
Sawtelle, 53 Ariz. 304, 88 P.2d 999 (1939); State v. Kofines, 33 R.I. 211, 80 A. 432 (1911).
"The courts have held that since the state has the absolute ownership of public property, the
opportunity to be employed in public enterprises is a privilege which the state may grant or
withhold as it sees fit. In following this line of reasoning, the courts have relied on dictum in Atkin
v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903) to the effect that the state may "prescribe the conditions upon
which it will permit work on its behalf, or on behalf of its municipalities."
'7232 U.S. 138, 146 (1914).
'239 U.S. 175, 192 (1915).
11239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915).
"People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 160, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (1915).
21239 U.S. 175, 192 (1915).
22 l91 U.S. 207, 222 (1903).
23239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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question applied to all occupations and not specifically to public works projects
as did the statute in Crane and Heim, the Truax case did not realistically serve
to break the pattern of Patsone, Crane and Heim.14 In Truax the Court struck
down another theory used to deny aliens the right to work by declaring that
the state's police power to promote health, safety, morals, and welfare .. .
"does not go so far as to make it possible for the State to deny to lawful
inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning
a livelihood. '25 While the Court did make clear that the business or occupation
of a person is property, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 the princi-
pal ground for its decision was that the Arizona statute had been preempted
by federal immigration law.2 7 Yet another theory which the courts have used
to deny employment to aliens involves the state's police power to regulate or
abolish occupations of a dangerous or antisocial nature.2 8 In Clarke v.
Dekebach,21 the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited aliens
from operating a pool hall. The Court reasoned that the aliens' ignorance of
our laws would further enhance the already dangerous tendencies of pool
rooms,30 thus establishing a logical connection between the classification of
aliens and the valid state interest in regulating pool rooms. In 1938, Justice
Stone laid the foundation for the future treatment of aliens in a footnote in
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 3 1 when he declared, "Nor need we
inquire . . .whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition . . . and which may call for a correspondingly more search-
ing judicial inquiry." 2 Ten years after the Carolene Products case, the Court
in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission," reflected Justice Stone's words
by establishing that "the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its
alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits.9 34 As did the
Truax35 Court earlier, the Court in Takahashi used the dual grounds of equal
protection3 and the supremacy clause 37 in holding the statute unconstitu-
"
4Cases cited note 14 supra.
-239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).26 d.
"Id. at 42. In using the supremacy clause to strike down the Arizona statute, the Court declared:
The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood
when lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount to the assertion of the right
to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases, they cannot live where they
cannot work.
2 This theory has been used to prohibit aliens from many occupations: see. e.g., Tokaji v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 20 Col. App. 2d 612, 67 P.2d 1082 (1937) (selling of intoxicating liquor);
Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 44 R.I. 333, 117 A. 359 (1922) (serving as a chauffeur).
2274 U.S. 392 (1927).
lid. at 397.
'1'304 U.S. 144 (1938).
121d. at 152-53 n.4.
-334 U.S. 410 (1948).
111d. at 420.
-239 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1915).
36334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
171d. at 416.
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tional. The California statute involved in Takahashi prohibited aliens from
commercial fishing within the three mile limit; by overturning this statute, the
Court crushed the state's proprietary interest theory 38 which had been used in
Patsone39 to deny aliens the right to hunt wild game.
While it is undisputed that a state has a legitimate interest in determining
whether or not applicants for certain positions possess the necessary qualifica-
tion of character or general fitness, 40 state restrictions on the employment
opportunities of aliens seem to have moved into the category of "suspect classi-
fications" and thus must serve a "compelling" state interest to be upheld." In
Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State,4 the California Supreme Court overturned a
statute which denied aliens employment in public works projects. The Califor-
nia court interpreted Takahashi as employing "a strict review of all state laws
which classified persons on the basis of alienage" and as destroying the concept
of the states proprietary interest over certain positions. 3 In Graham v.
Richardson," which involved a resident alien who had been denied welfare
benefits because of a state residence requirement, the Court firmly settled the
suspect classification issue by declaring that "classifications based on alienage
like those based on nationality or race are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny. ' 45 As in Yick Wo, the Court concluded that an alien is
a person for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the states
concern for its "fiscal integrity" does not justify such a discriminatory classifi-
cation .4 Also, in 1971, the Supreme Court of Alaska" and of Washington"8
held that an alien could not be denied the opportunity to practice law solely
on the basis of alienage. However, neither court considered the equal protection
issue or the supremacy clause issue, but based their holdings primarily on the
separation of powers doctrine. Recently, in Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar
a"Id. at 421.
3'232 U.S. 138, 146 (1914).
'
0Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S.
252 (1957). Both of these cases concerned a person seeking to enter the practice of law, and while
the Court held the applicant's fitness as a legitimate state interest, it also held that the qualifications
must be reasonably directed toward the applicant's ability and not invidiously discriminatory.
"Equal protection requirements in general include first, that the classification must be intended
to serve a legitimate state interest, and second, that the classification must serve that interest in a
logical way. However, certain classifications such as those based on race, nationality, or alienage
have been labeled "suspect" and require a heavy burden ofjustification such as serving an "overrid-
ing" or "compelling" state interest. See generally, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
'
271 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
'"ld. at 584-85, 456 P.2d at 657-58, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
"403 U.S. 365 (1971).
111d. at 372.
"Id. at 374.
"Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alaska 197 1).
"in Re Chi-Dooh-Li, 79 Wash. 2d 561, 488 P.2d 259 (1971).
"1484 P.2d 690, 691 (1971); 79 Wash. 2d 561, 565, 488 P.2d 259, 261 (1971). The courts in both
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Examiners,0 the California Supreme Court firmly and persuasively declared
that restrictions on the practice of law based on alienage are unconstitutional.
Seeming to draw on nearly every pro-alien precedent for support, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court balanced the state's interest in who practices law against
the challenged classification and found no logical connection between alienage
and the applicant's ability to practice law.5' However, it is interesting to note
that the Raffaelli court relied strictly on an equal protection analysis in order
to discredit the alienage classification, in contrast to the dual grounds of equal
protection and the supremacy clause as used in Truax, Prudy and to a lesser
extent in Graham.
When first examining the issue of whether aliens should be allowed to prac-
tice law or pursue any one of a number of restricted occupations, it might
appear that there should be some special occupational advantages to being a
citizen of the United States. However understandable such an initial reaction
might be, there are at least two broad policy reasons which rationally counter-
act it. First, occupational restrictions based on citizenship are not a part of the
tradition of this country. In regard to the practice of law specifically, the
American legal system is based on the English system. In Great Britain, aliens
as a class have not been prohibited from the practice of law.52 As pointed out
by Justice Powell in Griffiths,5 3 "our Nation welcomed and drew strength from
the immigration of aliens. Their contributions to the social and economic life
of the country were self-evident, especially during the periods when the demand
for human resources greatly exceeded the native supply. ' 4 Indeed, it was only
when the supply began to exceed the demand during the rapid industrialization
of the last half of the nineteenth century that the states began to restrict the
employment opportunities of aliens. Secondly, in the modern world the fate of
the United States is irrevocably bound to the fate of all other nations both
politically and economically. Chief Justice Burger in his dissent to Griffiths"
concedes that American nationals are allowed to practice law in more than a
dozen foreign countries; that an enlightened or sound policy would be to permit
qualified aliens to practice law in the United States. In an era when American
corporations transact business in foreign countries as commonly as they used
to cross state lines, it seems entirely anachronistic for a state to require a person
to be a citizen before he can practice law.
Even though Chief Justice Burger feels that the majority holding in Griffiths
is an enlightened policy, nevertheless, he feels compelled to dissent on the basis
these cases said in effect that the judiciary should determine the standards for lawyers and that a
legislative effort in the area is invalid.
'7 Cal. 2d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972).
"
51 d. at 301, 496 P.2d at 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
"
2Solicitors Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 27 § I.
1193 S. Ct. 2851 (1973).
111d. at 2853.
1Jd. at 2859.
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of his interpretation of the Constitution. 56 Likewise, Justice Rehnquist's first
point of attack in his dissent is that aliens are not subject to the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment, in other words, that an alien is not a "person"
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 57 The majority in Griffiths answer
this question primarily by the force of precedent which is admittedly substantial
on this issue.5 8 Justice Rehnquinst dismissed the previous decisions on the issue
as "irrelevant to the question of whether that Amendment prohibits legislative
classifications based upon this particular status," and went even further to
advance the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment by its own terms defines
those who are not citizens as a "lesser included class of all 'persons'," and thus
that classifications based on alienage should not be forbidden. 9 Even though
the Fourteenth Amendment does define the term "citizen" and forbids the
passage of any act which would interfere with the privileges or immunities of
a citizen, it is also very clear in its mandate that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 0 Secondly, it
seems clear that classifications based on alienage are not forbidden per se by
the Fourteenth Amendment; such classifications are only forbidden if they deny
equal protection, in other words, if they do not serve a compelling state interest
or if they do not serve such a compelling interest in a logical manner.6
The validity of a state's inquiring into the fitness of an applicant to practice
law is not disputed. 6 Therefore, it becomes clear that the real question of
Griffiths is whether the state requirement of citizenship for the practice of law
bears any logical relationship to the state interest. There are at least six sepa-
rate reasons that have been advanced as to why non-citizens should be prohib-
ited from practicing law. The majority in Griffiths considers some but not all
of the reasons. First it has been said that the practice of law demands an
appreciation of American institutions which the alien does not possess." In
Keenan v. Board of Bar Examiners of North Carolina,"4 it was declared that
"[n]either legal competence nor ethical fitness depends upon cultural provin-
cialism. 6 15 This statement seems as applicable to a non-citizen of the United
States as it was to a non-citizen of North Carolina in the Keenan case, espe-
cially when considering the high degree of legal training and background it
requires to not only be academically eligible to take the bar exam but to be
able to pass it. Secondly, it has been advanced that an alien can not practice
law because he cannot take the necessary oath to support the Constitution. 6
56ld.
'
71d. at 2862.
1"1d. at 2854.
"Id. at 2862-63.
"U.S. CONST. amend. xiv, § I.
"Cases cited note 41 supra.
"Cases cited note 40 supra.
'Large v. State Bar of California, 218 Cal. 334, 23 P.2d 288 (1933).
"1317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
"Id. at 1359.
"in Re Admission to the Bar, 61 Neb. 58, 84 N.W. 611, 612 (1900).
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This reasoning seems invalid in view of the fact that permanent resident aliens
are subject to military service and are required to take a similar oath. Also, as
the majority in Griffiths states, there is nothing to prevent the state from
conducting an investigation to determine if the applicant is only swearing to
the oath pro forma while manifesting his indifference to it elsewhere. 7 Another
reason cited for excluding aliens from the practice of law is that in the event
of war the alien might be seized and his clients caused to suffer. 8 This reasoning
is unsound when one considers that even citizen lawyers die, move away, or
give up the practice of law. This reason is further eroded by the fact that the
assignment of actions is provided for in Disciplinary Rule 2-1 10 (a)(2) of the
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. Aliens have
also been denied the opportunity to practice law on the grounds that the prac-
tice of law is a privilege and not a right." Of course, this piece of vague
reasoning was specifically discredited in the Graham case.7" Yet another reason
suggested for the denial of an alien's right to practice law is the difficulty
involved in educating civil law attorneys in the common law.7" This obviously
does not apply to aliens who receive their legal training in the United States.
It also falls apart when one considers that members of the Louisiana Bar
practice in other states and vice versa without apparent difficulty. A final
reason for denying aliens the right to practice law which both Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquinst stressed heavily in their dissents is the idea that
a lawyer is an officer of the court,77 and that in that role the lawyer has a
responsibility and authority almost equal to that of an elected public official.
The majority found this argument unconvincing and stated most persuasively
that "[i]t in no way denigrates a lawyer's high responsibilities to observe that
the powers 'to sign writs and subpoenas, to take recognizances [and] administer
oaths' hardly involve matters of state policy or acts of such unique responsibil-
ity as to entrust them only to citizens."" Although the officer of the court
theme should probably be stressed more by all law schools and bar associa-
tions, it is not realistic to believe that the attribute of citizenship will make a
lawyer take his responsibility either to his clients or to the courts more seri-
ously.
The Court in Griffiths has authoritatively and decisively crushed the notion
that a resident alien should not be allowed to practice law. While the Court
has made it clear that citizenship is no longer a valid state requirement for the
practice of law, it has not clarified what it means by the term "resident," which
is used repeatedly in the Griffiths opinion in conjunction with the term
6793 S. Ct. 2851, 2857 (1973).
68Ex Parte Thompson, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 355, 362 (1824).
6218 Cal. 334, 335, 23 P.2d 288, 289 (1933).
7403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
7
'Refugees and the Professions, 53 HARV. L. REv. 116 (1939).
7293 S. Ct. 2851, 2859, 2867 (1973).
"Id. at 2856.
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"alien." 74 It seems unlikely that the term "resident" refers to state residency
requirements. In Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners,"5 the court held that a
North Carolina rule requiring twelve months residency before an applicant
could take the bar examination was unconstitutional as imposing a burden on
interstate travel without serving a compelling state interest. The Keenan court
even denied the necessity of a short residency requirement for the constitution-
ally permissable purpose of investigating the applicants background.,, In
Webster v. Wofford, 77 the Georgia residency requirement was found to be
unconstitutional, although, in the Webster case it was held that a reasonable
period of residency for the purpose of investigation only is permissable. 8
Perhaps, the majority in Griffiths contemplated a federal definition of resi-
dency. Presumably the most applicable body of federal law on this subject
would be Federal Immigration law as embodied in Title 8 of the United States
Code.79 The basic definitions used in Title 8 are given in § 1101.10 The term
"residence" is defined in § I 101(a)(33).
The term "residence" means the place of general abode; the place of general
abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without
regard to intent.8'
In the past the courts seem to have been reluctant to give more than a general
meaning to the term "residence.""2 For instance in Toy Teung Kwong v.
Acheson,8 3 the court stated:
It is a question of fact in each instance as to which is the "principal dwelling
place". The court's use of "actual residence" must be viewed from that
perspective .... "Actual residence" is not synonomous with physical pres-
ence, nor does the court hold that a sojourn abroad of any duration, however,
transient, or whatever the purpose forfeits domestic residence."4
The vast majority of immigrants and special immigrants as defined in § 11011
would fit within the foregoing definitions of "residence;" but what would be
the status of certain nonimmigrant aliens as defined in § 1101 (a)(15),88 e.g.,
the career diplomat 7 from a foreign government who lives in Washington on
7
'ld. at 2854, 2855, 2856.
15317 F. Supp. 1350, 1361 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
7 1d. at 1360-61.
11321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
7
'lid. at 1262.
7 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C (1952).
"1d. § 1101.
'lid. § 1101(a)(33).
"
2See generally, Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950); In Re Olan, 257 F. Supp. 884
(S.D. Cal. 1966).
1197 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1951).
'id. at 747.
"Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15), I 101(a)(27) (1952).
"Id. § I101 (a)(15).
'lid. § 1101 (a)(I 5)(A)(i).
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an apparently permanent basis? The majority in Griffiths presumably gives a
clue to the preceding question when they state:
Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the
armed forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society.M
This statement implies that the Griffiths Court contemplated not only someone
in the nature of a "permanent" resident alien but also one who would be in a
position to integrate himself into our society. The term "permanent" is defined
in § l101(a)(31).
The term "permanent" means a relationship of continuing or lasting nature,
as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even
though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the
United States or of the individual, in accordance with law.89
Based on the preceding statements of the courts and the definitions in § 1101,
it can be said with certainty that those aliens, who have at least established the
beginnings of a lasting relationship with this country, shall reap the benefits of
Griffiths.
It seems clear that a likely immediate result of the Griffiths decision could
be that the state legislatures will soon abolish the state statutes that restrict the
nonpolitical occupational opportunities of aliens.9 0 The long-term result may
be more noteworthy. The next challenge to restrictions on the rights of aliens
should logically be in the area of voting rights. Based on the decision by the
California Supreme Court in the Raffaelli case, it has been suggested that the
arguments and counter arguments used in that case and the wealth of past pro-
alien cases might also be used successfully in a voting right's case.9' For exam-
ple, the argument that voters must appreciate American institutions can hardly
be very effective after Raffaelli, Keenan or Griffiths.12 The argument that the
state has a compelling interest in having an informed electorate would find a
persuasive analogous counter argument in Dunn v. Blumstein,93 where the
court ruled that a voter cannot be persumed to be ignorant just because he
recently moved to a state. The decision in Griffiths can only add a great deal
of strength to a voting rights challenge. However, the most compelling argu-
ment for the enfranchisement of aliens does not stem from legal reasoning or
interpretation but from a simple recognition of reality. The resident alien in
this country pays taxes, sends his children to public schools, serves in the armed
forces, and in general is an integral part of the society. It seems inherent in a
"93 S. Ct. 2851, 2855 (1973).
"Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(31) (1952).
"This prediction is based on the actions of the California Legislature following the Raffaelli case.
61 CAL. L. REv. 365 n.53 (1973).
"Id. at 374.
21d.
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
"Id. at 358.
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democratic form of government that the resident alien should have a voice in
deciding who will guide the government and determine his future.
John L. Scott
